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PRISON CONDITIONS AND DIMINISHED
CAPACITY-A PROPOSED DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
The defense of diminished capacity is at the forefront of
the controversial field of criminal responsibility. Essentially,
diminished capacity is the defendant's lack of full responsibil-
ity for the criminal acts with which he is charged. It is available
to defendants who do not harbor all of the requisite elements
of the crime.
Murder in the first degree has been reduced to second
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter or involuntary man-
slaughter on the basis of diminished mental capacity brought
on by intoxication,1 injury,2 disease,' or external pressures., In
each situation it is the capacity to harbor premeditation, mal-
ice aforethought, or intent to kill that is affected.5
1. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People
v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
2. People v. Heffington, 32 Cal. App. 3d 1, 107 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1973); People v.
Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
3. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33
Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949); People v. Long, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974).
4. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1977) defines murder as the "unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE §
188 (West 1970), dealing with malice, provides in relevant part: "[Mlalice may be
express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate mention unlaw-
fully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, .. . when the circumstan-
ces attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 189 (West Supp. 1977) distinguishes first and second degree murder:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or
explosive, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpe-
tration of [enumerated acts], is murder of the first degree; and all other
kinds of murders are of the second degree.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1970) provides in relevant part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without mal-
ice. It is of three kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount-
ing to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspec-
tion . . ..
See also id. § 20, which requires that in "every crime or public offense there must exist
a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
' These distinctions can be summarized as follows: The unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought is murder. If because of diminished capacity theperpe-
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Prison conditions can provide the type of external pres-
sures which would allow the use of such a defense. The condi-
tions that exist inside American prisons have been held to con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United
States Constitution.' The general atmosphere of fear, appre-
hension and degrading conditions all have their effects on the
minds of those confined in prison. A defense of diminished
capacity due to prison conditions is proposed in order to take
these factors into account when dealing with the culpability of
a person who has committed a crime while under the influence
of these types of stress.
This comment focuses its analysis of the diminished ca-
pacity defense on the psychiatric testimony that has been of-
fered in each case. It is the crucial evidence in determining the
mental state of the defendant, which in turn establishes his
degree of culpability for the crime charged. The psychiatric
bases of diminished capacity findings can be provided by evi-
dence of prison conditions as they presently exist. Once this
relationship is established, the evidentiary basis for the intro-
duction of prison conditions in a diminished capacity defense
is explained and supported.
Ultimately, this comment argues that prison conditions
can provide the basis of a diminished capacity defense, and
charges against those who commit crimes while subject to in-
carceration should be susceptible to mitigation.
THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA
Diminished capacity in California is a concept in criminal
law used to identify the cognitive ability of the defendant
trator is unable to entertain malice, but has formed the intent to kill, the crime is
voluntary manslaughter. If because of diminished capacity the actor did not intend to
kill, his crime, if any, is involuntary manslaughter.
6. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Pugh v.
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d. Cir. 1971);
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971);
Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), afJ'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
When a reference to "prison" is made in this comment, maximum security prisons
and not minimum security detention centers or jails are being referred to. While
imprisonment of any type will produce a psychological reaction, the grave psychologi-
cal disturbances which maximum security incarceration produces are the bases for a
finding of diminished capacity due to prison conditions.
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which, upon a finding of some type of mental impairment,
negates the requisite mens rea for specific intent crimes. Upon
the negation of elements such as intent to kill and malice
aforethought in the crime of homicide, a lesser degree of
criminal responsibility is attributed to the actor's conduct for
which full criminal liability would otherwise be imposed. The
focus here will be on three specific types of mental impairment
-those caused by mental disease or defect, unconsciousness,
and irresistible impulse.'
Mental Defect or Disease
The traditional approach to criminal responsibility fol-
lowed the "all-or-nothing" approach of M'Naughten's Case,'
which imposed on the actor either complete criminal responsi-
bility or a complete lack of criminal responsibility due to insan-
ity. California's interpretation of that rule states: "Legal insan-
ity . . . means a diseased or deranged condition of the mind
which makes a person incapable of knowing or understanding
the nature and quality of his act, or makes a person incapable
of knowing or understanding that his act was wrong." 9
In People v. Wells the California Supreme Court rejected
the "all-or-nothing" approach for the first time. 0 Wells was
charged with assault by a life convict. The trial court had re-
fused to accept medical testimony that Wells was suffering
from a "state of tension" with a high sensitivity to external
stimuli which would cause him to react abnormally." This tes-
timony was offered not as a defense of insanity but rather to
negate the malice aforethought which was required to sustain
7. There are court decisions on diminished capacity that are omitted from this
comment. The focus on psychiatric testimony relevant to a finding of diminished
capacity precludes the inclusion of other decisions, including those dealing with volun-
tary intoxication. See generally Cooper, Diminished Capacity, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
308 (1971); Student Symposium on the Proposed Criminal Code: Insanity, Intoxication
and Diminished Capacity Under the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 550 (1972); Comment, Keeping Wolff from the Door: California's Diminished
Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (1972); Comment, Diminished Capacity: The
Middle Ground of Criminal Responsibility, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 911 (1975); Com-
ment, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 561
(1971).
8. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
9. COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los
ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 4.00 (Supp.
1974) [hereinafter cited as CALJIC].
10. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949).
11. Id. at 344, 202 P.2d at 62.
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the charge. 2
The California Supreme Court held that competent evi-
dence which tended to show that a defendant either possessed
or did not possess the specific requisite mental state at the time
he committed the overt act was admissible, even if it was not
admissible to show legal sanity or insanity. 3 The court in so
holding opened the way for evidence to be admissible to negate
elements of specific intent crimes at the guilt phase of trial.
Ten years later the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
Wells in People v. Gorshen.14 With police officers at his side,
Gorshen shot his foreman, who had sent him home from work
for being intoxicated. Psychiatric evidence was admitted at
trial to show that Gorshen suffered from chronic paranoid schi-
zophrenia' 5-a disintegration of mind and personality-which
made his ability to work become increasingly important to him
as proof of his manhood." In the psychiatrist's opinion, Gor-
shen acted as an automaton, and the fact that there was no
possibility of escape could not stop the train of obsessive
thoughts which resulted in the killing."
12. California's bifurcated system of trial first subjects a defendent to a trial
which determines guilt or innocence. If found guilty, a second trial is held solely to
determine the issue of sanity. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1977). The evidence
in question was offered at the guilt stage of Wells' trial, attempting to negate elements
of the assault charge. See id. § 4500.
13. 33 Cal. 2d at 347, 350-51, 202 P.2d at 63, 66. The court declined to reverse
the conviction, however, on the basis that all of the evidence, including some of Wells'
own testimony, overwhelmingly proved malice. Id. at 358, 202 P.2d at 70.
14. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
15. Id. at 722, 336 P.2d at 495.
This type of schizophrenia is characterized by the presence of persecutory or
grandiose delusions, often associated with hallucinations. The patient's attitude is
frequently hostile and aggressive, and his behavior tends to be consistent with his
delusions. The patient often uses the mechanism of projection, which ascribes to others
characteristics he can not accept in himself. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC
& STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS No. 295.3, at 34 (2d ed. 1968).
16. 51 Cal. 2d at 722, 336 P.2d at 495.
17. Id. at 723, 336 P.2d at 496. The psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Diamond, testified
that Gorshen was confronted with
the imminent possibility of complete loss of his sanity. . . . [A]s an
alternate to total disintegration ... , it's possible for . . . an individual
of this kind, to develop an obsessive murderous rage, an unappeasable
anger. . . . [AID individual in this state of crisis will do anything to
avoid the threatened insanity, and it's this element which lends strength
to his compulsive behavior so that he could think nothing else but to get
O'Leary, so he went home and got the gun and shot him; and [as] is
usually the case in this type of event, the shooting itself released the
danger of [defendant's complete mental disintegration].
Id. at 722, 336 P.2d at 496 (emphasis added). See generally Diamond, With Malice
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The court ruled that psychiatric testimony should be ad-
missible on the question of the defendant's mental state prior
to the killing. The court reasoned that psychiatric testimony
would be crucial in determining whether the defendant was
incapable of formulating the necessary mental state because of
intoxication, injury or disease."8 However, the court refrained
from stating that such evidence could negate the element of
malice to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter"s since
this would require the objective standard of provocation to be
overcome.20 Thus, it was established that a plea of not guilty
placed the existence of the requisite elements of the crime at
issue, allowing the defendant to show that he did not possess a
sufficient mental state at the time of its commission.2 The
Wells-Gorshen rule required that the element negated-
deliberation, premeditation, or intent to kill-have a causal
relationship with the crime committed.
A change of focus began with People v. Wolff, 2 in which
the California Supreme Court established an ameliorative doc-
trine taking into account the quality of the actor's reflection on
his intended act. Wolff was a fifteen-year-old boy who had
intended to kill his mother and had premeditated and reflected
Aforethought, 2 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS 1-45 (1957); Diamond, Criminal Re-
sponsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV. 59 (1961).
18. 51 Cal. 2d at 731, 336 P.2d at 502. For other cases dealing with negation ofdeliberation and premeditation, see People v. Crosier, 41 Cal. App. 3d 712, 116 Cal.Rptr. 467 (1974); People v. Fonville, 35 Cal. App. 3d 693, 111 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1973);
People v. Gibson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 917, 101 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1972). For other casesdealing with negation of specific intent, see People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); People v. Chapman, 261 Cal. App. 2d 149, 67 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1968); People v. Wilson, 261 Cal. App. 2d 12, 67 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968); People v.
Juarez, 258 Cal. App. 2d 349, 65 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1968).
19. See note 5 supra.
20. 51 Cal. 2d at 731, 336 P.2d at 502. The court did express its willingness to
overturn this rule in dictum. Id. at 733, 336 P.2d at 503. See also Weihofen & Overhol-
ser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959, 969 (1947).
21. The Wells and Gorshen decisions provided the basis of CALJIC No. 3.35(1970). This instruction reads that in crimes that require a certain specific intent or
mental state, the jury must determine "if, at the time when the crime allegedly was
committed, the defendant was suffering from some abnormal mental or physical condi-
tion, however caused, which prevented him from forming the specific intent or mental
state essential to constitute the crime or degree of crime with which he is charged." If
there is reasonable doubt, it must be found that he did not have such specific intent
or mental state. See generally F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 355 (1961); Fingarette, Diminished Mental Capacity as a Criminal LawDefence, 37 MOD. L. REv. 264 (1974); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Casesfor Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1051, 1077-89
(1975).
22. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
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upon that act. While the psychiatric evidence did not negate
any of the requisite mental states for murder,'2 testimony was
given which described the defendant as suffering from a perma-
nent form of schizophrenia, affecting his ability to think con-
ceptually.24 The court stated that the true test of premeditation
and deliberation had to include consideration of the extent to
which a defendant could maturely and meaningfully reflect
upon the gravity of his contemplated acts. 5
This formulation was reconfirmed in People v. Goedecke,8
where a youth's murder of his parents was characterized as
bizarre and out-of-character. The defense psychiatrists testi-
fied that Goedecke was in a dissociative state which caused a
lack of consciousness of his action.27 The California Supreme
Court concluded that because Goedecke did not have the ca-
pacity to maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity
of his contemplated act, the requisite elements of the first de-
gree murder charge were negated. 8 In these cases and their
progeny, 2 the undisputed evidence of impaired mental pro-
23. See note 5 supra.
24. Psychiatric testimony described Wolff as a schizophrenic who, because of his
emotional problems and his own conflicts, was unable to prevent himself from acting
on whatever ideas or compulsions he may have had, even if he knew the difference
between right and wrong. 61 Cal. 2d at 814, 394 P.2d at 970, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
25. Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287. The substantial impairment
to thought process was seen by the court to be reflected in a limitation of his under-
standing. Reflection upon the murder and its consequences with realization of the
enormity of the evil involved, appeared to have been materially vague and detached.
Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
26. 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967).
27. Id. at 856, 423 P.2d at 781, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 629. One of the prosecution
psychiatrists described dissociation as a state in which one who committed a crime of
violence believed someone else was performing the act. He then concluded that disso-
ciative reaction in situations like Goedecke's was very often the product of the crime
rather than the cause of it. Id. at 865, 423 P.2d at 786-87, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
28. The defendant's lack of emotion confirmed to the court that his actions were
completely foreign to his character and that he was not a mentally and emotionally
normal individual. His ability to understand and reflect were materially vague and
detached, falling short of the minimum essential elements of first degree murder. Id.
at 857-58, 423 P.2d at 782, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 630. See CALJIC No. 8.77 (1976), which
provides:
[Ihf you find that the defendant's mental capacity was diminished to the
extent that you have a reasonable doubt whether he did, maturely and
meaningfully, premeditate, deliberate, and reflect upon the gravity of his
contemplated act, or form an intent to kill, you can not find him guilty
of a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of the first degree.
29. See People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969);
People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153, 454 P.2d 686, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969); People v.
Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968) (evidence did not
establish mature and meaningful reflection); People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423
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cesses rather than evidence of lack of capacity to form the
requisite mens rea resulted in a reduction in the grade of the
offense.
California courts have since made determinations extend-ing the application of the diminished capacity defense. In
People v. Long, mental defect or mental disease was sufficient
in itself to negate intent to kill so as to reduce the charge of
murder to one of involuntary manslaughter.'" This decision
clarified People v. Mosher, where the court found diminished
capacity based on intoxication, while stating in dicta that men-
tal defect or disease could also be mitigating factors.3 The
Long court found no cases where a mental defect or mental
disease in the defendant had negated the intent to kill, but saw
no difference between that condition and unconsciousness due
to involuntary intoxication.32
Malice aforethought has also been deemed susceptible to
negation by use of a diminished capacity defense. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court in People v. Conley33 enlarged the tradi-
tional defense of nonmalicious homicide to include incapacity
to harbor malice because of mental defect, mental disease or
intoxication, and thereby reduced the charge of homicide to
involuntary manslaughter."4 The same standards were thus
required for malice as for premeditation and intent to kill.
The net effect of these diminished capacity decisions has
P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967) (defendant did not possess the "quantum of personal
turpitude" required for murder in the higher degree); People v. Austin, 270 Cal. Apf.
2d 845, 76 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1969).
30. 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 685, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1974). See also 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 210 (1974).
31. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 390, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1969).
32. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 686, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
33. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). Conley was accused ofkilling two people while under a sustained intoxication. He had stated to friends that
he was going to kill the victims, but recalled nothing of the incident at the time of his
arrest. Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
34. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822. See note 5 supra for degrees
of homicide. The finding here was based on testimony that Conley was in a dissociative
state at the time of the killings and because of personality fragmentation did not
function with his normal personality. 64 Cal. 2d at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr.
at 818. See also People v. Crosier, 41 Cal. App. 3d 712, 116 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1974); People
v. Yanikian, 39 Cal. App. 3d 366, 114 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1974); People v. Gibson, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 917, 101 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1972).
CALJIC No. 8.41 (1970) provides that there is no malice aforethought if the evi-dence shows that "due to diminished capacity caused by mental illness, mental defect,
or intoxication, the defendant did not have the capacity to attain the mental state
constituting malice aforethought, even though the killing be intentional, voluntary,
deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked."
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been to allow negation of the elements of a specific intent crime
so as to mitigate it to a crime of a lesser degree. Mental defect,
mental disease and intoxication all serve this purpose, with the
requisite mens rea being either negated or substantially af-
fected due to a lack of mature and meaningful reflection on its
consequences. If mental disease or defect can not be proved,
there are two other categories of diminished capacity where
complete criminal responsibility is not imposed.
Unconsciousness
Unconsciousness may solely affect an individual's state of
mind; it need not reach the physical dimensions commonly
associated with the term. It can exist where there is a physical
act but no consciousness of that act. In such a case it is a
complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide.35 The un-
consciousness defense differs from diminished capacity in that
the latter provides only a partial defense by negating the requi-
site mental state for the particular crime whereas unconscious-
ness may negate the capacity to commit any crime at all.3"
In People v. Newton" the defendant was shot in the stom-
ach and raised the defense of unconsciousness to the murder of
a police officer that ensued. He remembered "crawling . . . a
moving sensation," but nothing else until he found himself at
the entrance of a hospital with no knowledge of how he arrived
there.3" A psychiatrist testified at trial that Newton suffered a
profound reflex shock reaction from the gunshot wound, and
that it was "not at all uncommon for a person shot in the
abdomen to lose consciousness and [suffer a] reflex shock con-
dition for short periods of time."39
35. People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 376, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 405 (1970). CAL.
PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970) provides in relevant part: "All persons are capable of
committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: .. .(5) Persons
who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof."
36. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 406. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West
1970). Some difficulty may occur however. See CALJIC No. 4.30 (1970), which pro-
vides: "Where a person commits an act without being conscious thereof, such act is
not criminal even though, if committed by a person who was conscious, it would be a
crime." This instruction implies that it is the volitional element which precludes
unconsciousness arising from voluntary intoxication from being a complete defense;
however, any such volitional element is lacking in the case of diminished capacity
arising from mental defect or disease, which would only be a partial defense. See, e.g.,
People v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1018 (1966) (unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication).
37. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
38. Id. at 373, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
39. Id. at 373, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03. The psychiatrist was Dr. Bernard Dia-
[Vol. 17
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The court of appeal held that where it was not self-
induced, as by voluntary intoxication or the equivalent, uncon-
sciousness was a complete defense to a charge of criminal homi-
cide." It is noteworthy, though, that the court did not ade-
quately clarify the difference between the defenses of uncon-
sciousness and diminished capacity due to mental disease or
defect which was sufficient to negate intent to kill.
Three years later, it was suggested in People v. Heffington
that unconsciousness "included not only states of coma or
immobility, but also conditions in which the subject acted
without awareness."'" That decision turned on the defendant's
recollection of what occurred, which would indicate awareness
so as to preclude unconsciousness. Detailed recall of the cir-
cumstances of the alleged crime would indicate that the defen-
dant's mental impairment did not reach a level that would
negate intent to kill.4" The court in Newton stated that "the
defenses of diminished capacity and unconsciousness were
[entirely separate] and neither incompatible nor mutually
exclusive,""4 which indicated that both could have been raised
at trial with a subsequent determination on the basis of the
evidence.
As has been shown, the complete defense of unconscious-
ness can exist independently of or compatibly with one of dim-
inished capacity. If a complete defense of unconsciousness can
not be proved, a partial defense of diminished capacity based
on unconsciousness can still be used to reduce the actor's crimi-
nal responsibility, provided, however, that there is a sufficient
level of unawareness by the defendant of his actions.
Irresistible Impulse
Irresistible impulse has never been a complete defense to
a crime in California, 44 but it is relevant to negate a mental
state essential to a crime. In this way irresistible impluse serves
mond, who had also testified in Gorshen. See note 17 supra.
40. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 405. See also People v. Graham, 71
Cal. 2d 303, 316, 455 P.2d 153, 161, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 225 (1969); People v. Wilson, 66
Cal. 2d 749, 760-62, 427 P.2d 820, 827-29, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156, 163-65 (1967).
41. 32 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 107 Cal. Rptr. 859, 865 (1973).
42. Id. Compare id. and People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1974), with People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974).
43. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
44. People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 45, 338 P.2d 416, 421 (1959); People v. Hubert,
119 Cal. 216, 223, 51 P. 329, 331 (1897); People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120, 122-23 (1882).
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as a type of diminished capacity defense, imposing a lesser
degree of criminal responsibility on the actor.
In People v. Cantrell the defendant killed a young boy
after sexually assaulting him; he claimed he had no memory
of the act until the next day.45 Psychiatric testimony was intro-
duced to show that Cantrell lacked the ability to form the
intent to kill." The psychiatrists agreed that Cantrell's stran-
gling of the victim was a compulsive reaction to the victim's
vigorous and vocal resistance.47 The California Supreme Court
held that a defendant who raised the defense of diminished
capacity at the guilt phase of the trial had to be permitted to
show by competent evidence that his act was the product of an
irresistible impulse and that the irresistible impulse was due
to mental disease. The court also held admissible evidence
that the defendant killed on an irresistible impulse arising from
a mental defect. The court reasoned this evidence was central
to the twin issues of intent to kill and malice aforethought." In
this way a combination of mental and externally imposed fac-
tors was deemed relevant in mitigating murder to manslaugh-
ter on the basis of an irresistible impulse. 0
45. 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
46. Id. at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796. One psychiatrist testified
that at the time of the choking the defendant was trying to turn off some noise (the
boy's screaming), not trying to take a human life. Cantrell did not have sufficient
mental capacity to reflect upon the gravity of the contemplated act at that moment,
and his design and purpose was not specifically to take a life. Id. at 687 n.3, 504 P.2d
at 1265-66 n.3, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02 n.3.
47. Another psychiatrist diagnosed Cantrell as being a "situational homosexual"
with a schizoid personality. He explained Cantrell's violent behavior by saying that
there was a point at which something happened, namely the boy's screaming, which
set off a chain reaction. Cantrell then stopped responding to the boy and his outward
surroundings and began responding to his "inner world;" his violence was a result of
the reaction to his own fear of going crazy. 8 Cal. 3d at 687 n.3, 504 P.2d at 1265-66
n.3, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02 n.3.
48. Id. at 685, 504 P.2d at 1264, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 800. See note 12 and accompa-
nying text supra.
49. 8 Cal. 3d at 686, 504 P.2d at 1265, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
50. It should be noted, however, that the court affirmed Cantrell's first degree
murder conviction because the elements of premeditation and malice aforethought
were eliminated by the felony murder doctrine, which merely required a showing of
specific intent to commit the particular felony in order to support a finding of first
degree murder. Id. at 688, 504 P.2d at 1266-67, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04. See also People
v. Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d 865, 868-69, 236 P.2d 570, 572-73 (1951). CALJIC No. 8.78
(Supp. 1976) summarizes the holding of this decision:
In determining if defendant had diminished capacity, if there was evi-
dence that defendant's act was the product of an irresistible impulse, you
must consider whether or not such irresistible impulse, if any, was due
to mental illness, mental disease or mental defect so as to render defen-
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As had been shown, negating the specific state of mind of
a defendant can be accomplished by a number of different
methods, all under the theory of diminished capacity. Of the
several variants of diminished capacity, irresistible impulse
seems most applicable to the prison context. While prison con-
ditions could provide a basis for mental disease sufficient to
meet the standards for a Wells-Gorshen type of diminished
capacity,' a situation where a prisoner is acting spontaniously
under external stress would tend to be classified as due to an
irresistible impulse, resulting in a reduction of criminal respon-
sibility for the act committed under that analysis.
After an examination of the conditions that exist in pris-
ons, this comment applies the diminished capacity doctrine to
those conditions in order to show that crimes committed under
the stress of penal incarceration should be subject to mitiga-
tion.
PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
"San Quentin and Folsom are disgraceful dungeons. Vaca-
ville and Soledad are wholly inadequate. The physical facilities
of these institutions are incompatible with fundamental and
minimal principles of decency and humanity.""5
Historically, federal courts have been reluctant to interfere
with the administrative and political processes that underlie
the correctional system. In recent years, however, decisions
indicate that federal courts are abandoning their implicit
"hands-off policy" because of the deteriorating conditions in
American prisons. One of the tests for determining whether or
not prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment53 is whether or not those
conditions are of such character as to shock the general consci-
ence.5" Both general prison conditions"5 and specific circum-
dant incapable of forming the mental states essential to murder or volun-
tary manslaughter.
51. See text accompanying notes 103-113 infra.
52. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT & RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON SENTENCING & PRISON REFORM 6 (1975).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
54. McAninch, Penal Incarceration and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 25
S.C.L. REV. 579, 584 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McAninch].
55. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), afj'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also McAninch,
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stances of solitary confinement" have met this test and have
led to findings of cruel and unusual punishment.
These conditions supply external pressures similar to those
found in diminished capacity cases so as to allow a mitigation
of criminal responsibility for the perpetrators of crime in the
prison context. A negation of premeditation, deliberation, or
intent because of the psychological effects of penal incarcera-
tion serves as the basis for this defense of diminished capacity.
Prison Life as Cruel and Unusual
"Prison is a closed, tightly controlled environment for
those who have violated the criminal law and who have been
lawfully incarcerated for doing so." 57 It is an environment
where guards and inmates coexist at close quarters, where ten-
sion between them is unremitting, and where frustration, re-
sentment and despair are commonplace. 8 It is in this context
that the mental capacity for criminal acts committed by those
confined in prison must be evaluated. Tracing the use of the
cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment by federal
courts to force prison reform highlights both the conditions
themselves and society's growing awareness of these condi-
tions. 9
supra note 54, at 596-602.
56. Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Wright v. McMann,
257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), on remand, 321
F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885
(1972); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also McAninch,
supra note 54, at 584-90.
While this comment focuses on maximum security prison conditions only, similar
findings of cruel and unusual conditions have been found in jails as well. See Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S.
977 (1974) (Charles Street Jail, Boston); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D.
Md. 1972) (Baltimore City Jail); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center, Alameda County); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972) (Lucas County Jail).
57. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).
58. Id. at 562. Not only do prisoners feel that guards deliberately forment racial
conflict, but some prisoners report that guards actually help supply arms to groups of
prisoners for racial fights. E. WRIGHT, THE POLrTICS OF PUNISHMENT 110 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
59. 418 U.S. at 555-56. A prisoner's justifiable escape from prison has already
been recognized by the California courts in People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823,
118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). The court there recognized that if the conditions of a pris-
oner's incarceration were such that:
(1) he [or she] is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual
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Early United States Supreme Court decisions interpreted
the eighth amendment as prohibiting only inhuman and barba-
rous punishments.'" The Court then expanded its interpreta-
tion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, observing
that the eighth amendment "[was] not fastened to the obso-
lete but [acquired] meaning as public opinion [became] en-
lightened by humane justice."'" Trop v. Dulles" further ex-
panded the definition of cruel and unusual to include mental
cruelty, with Chief Justice Warren stating that in determining
whether or not a method of punishment was cruel and unusual
a court had to look to "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 6 3
While the above decisions defined adequate criteria for
determining if a punishment was cruel and unusual, it was not
until 1966, when a district court in California held that condi-
tions of solitary confinement at the California Correctional
Training Facility at Soledad constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, that federal courts began to review prison condi-
tions. 4 In Jordan v. Fitzharris, the plaintiff was confined to an
isolation cell without furniture, adequate light or ventilation,
attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future, (2) there is
no time for complaint or such action has proved futile in the past, (3)
there is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts, and (4) there is no
force or violence used in the escape, then an escape is deemed necessary
and justifiable if the prisoner immediately reports to the proper authori-
ties when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
Id. at 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115. The same logic used to justify the escape can be
used to mitigate criminal charges under a diminished capacity defense because of
prison conditions. See Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from
Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
110 (1975); Note, A Reexamination of Justifiable Escape, 2 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L.
205 (1976).
60. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). See generally Granucci,
"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.REV. 839 (1969); Comment, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964).
61. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). A punishment of 15 years
in prison was given to a United States government official in the Philippine Islands
because of falsification of a public document. This was declared cruel and unusual
punishment by the United States Supreme Court as being disproportionate to the
gravity of the crime committed.
62. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional a law which provided that a citizen shall lose his nationality by deserting the
military or naval forces of the United States in time of war. This divestiture of citizen-
ship was held to violate the eighth amendment because it was penal in nature and
prescribed a cruel and unusual punishment.
63. Id. at 101.
64. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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or personal hygiene articles. 5 The district court explicitly re-
jected the hands-off policy and held that confinement under
such conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The responsible prison authorities were charged with tolerating
deplorable and inhuman prison conditions. These lamentable
conditions moved the court to intervene and restore the living
conditions to a level demanded by the Constitution."
In finding a violation of the eighth amendment the court
noted two undesirable side-effects generated by degrading
prison conditions: inmate hostility towards prison officials,
which might blossom into open revolt, and violent and bizarre
behavior on the part of individual inmates."
Not only have California prison conditions run afoul of
constitutional standards, but the entire Arkansas prison sys-
tem has been held to be violative of the eighth amendment. An
Arkansas district court in Holt v. Sarver"s scrutinized four
areas of the prison system: living conditions, solitary confine-
ment, special privileges for inmates, and rehabilitation proce-
65. The cell was solid concrete, six feet by eight feet, almost totally dark, and
entirely devoid of furnishings except for a toilet which could only be flushed by some-
one outside the cell. During Jordan's eleven-day period of incarceration the cell was
not cleaned; it was not only covered with his bodily wastes but also that of its previous
occupants. He was given no opportunity to wash himself and was forced to handle and
eat his food without even the semblance of cleanliness or any provision for sanitary
conditions. Jordan was kept totally naked in the unheated cell with only a stiff canvas
mat to sleep on. His repeated requests for medical assistance were effectively ignored.
Id. at 676-77.
66. Id. at 680. The district court stated that persons confined in state prisons
were within the protection of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which created a cause of
action for deprivations of constitutional rights against those who acted under color of
state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See also Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp.
683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Gordon
v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948). See generally Edwards v. Duncan, 355
F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Hancock v.Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202, 204-
05 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124, 126-28 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Com-
ment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1962).
67. 257 F. Supp. at 680. See also Sturc, Conditions of Confinement: The Consti-
tutional Limits on the Treatment of Prisoners, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 42, 73-84 (1975);
Note, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Prison Discipline
in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REV. 919 (1974).
68. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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dures. The court found that the conditions of confinement in
the aggregate were inherently dangerous and that the living
conditions were degrading and disgusting. 9 In the court's esti-
mation, mere confinement within a given institution could
amount to a cruel and unusual punishment where the confine-
ment was characterized by conditions and practices so bad as
to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people
even though particular inmates were never subjected to disci-
plinary action.7 0 The Arkansas convict, subjected to an envi-
ronment filled with fear and lacking legitimate rewards,
quickly loses the capacity to rehabilitate himself and proceeds
to develop deep feelings of resentment towards the society
which confined him.7 This consideration of not only the inter-
nal conditions but also their effects upon inmates who would
one day be returned to society set the stage for the many cases
to follow, declaring both the general conditions of incarceration
and the specific conditions of solitary confinement to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment.
Following the trail pioneered by the Arkansas district
court in Holt, courts in both Mississippi72 and Alabama" held
prison conditions within their borders as constituting cruel and
unusual punishment for their inhabitants. In Mississippi, a
district court found the conditions at Parchman State Peniten-
tiary unfit for human habitation.74 In the court's view the con-
ditions at Parchman deprived the prisoners of their constitu-
tional right to an adequate existence.75 The court reasoned that
an adequate existence should include decent food prepared
69. Id. at 381. See Comment, Prisoners' Rights: Personal Security, 42 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 305, 375-77 (1970).
70. 309 F. Supp. at 372-73. The conditions included: trusty guards who abused
their position; a barracks life where fear was constant because of the proliferation of
weapons and the frequency of homosexual attacks; overcrowded and unsanitary isola-
tion cells; and a lack of an effective rehabilitation program. While each of these factors
were not per se determinative of the eighth amendment issue, when taken in the
aggregate they resulted in a finding of cruel and unusual conditions.
71. Id. at 379. See also Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 544-45 (1976).
72. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974).
73. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
74. 349 F. Supp. at 887. This finding was based on inadequate waste disposal
facilities presenting an immediate health hazard; inadequate water supply facilities;
buildings in a "deplorable state of maintenance and repair" with inadequate electrical
wiring, heating and bathroom facilities; and inadequate protection of inmates. Id.
75. Id. at 894. See also Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Lipman, Mississippi's Prison Experience, 45
Miss. L.J. 685 (1974).
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under sanitary conditions, proper regard by prison authorities
for the inmates physical health, and suitable medical services
under state law. The court found the absence of these essential
features not only cruel and unusual but also detrimental to the
rehabilitation process.
A district court in Alabama held that the state's penal
institutions were all in violation of the eighth amendment,
emphasizing the overcrowded, unsanitary living conditions and
the violent atmosphere predominant throughout the system. In
Pugh v. Locke, a United States public health officer examined
a prison's facilities and found them entirely unfit under pre-
vailing public health standards. In light of his examination the
officer recommended the facilities be closed as they repre-
sented an immediate threat to the health of the inmates.6
"[Tihe rampant violence and jungle atmosphere" of the pris-
ons was reflected by the fact "that most prisoners carried some
form of homemade or contraband weapon, which was consid-
ered necessary for self-protection." ' 7 Guards were found to
rarely enter the cell blocks and dormitories, especially at night
when their presence was most needed. Guards who did enter
cell blocks to locate weapons did not search completely enough
to substantially check the proliferation of weapons. Finally, the
guards were unable to prevent outbreaks of violence and were
unable to control outbreaks which did take place. 7 The court
concluded the prison environment thwarted any attempts at
inmate rehabilitation and materially enhanced inmate deha-
bilitation.79
Even though conditions of confinement of the general
prison population have been held violative of the eighth
amendment in relatively few instances, courts have been con-
sistent, starting with Jordan,"0 in finding conditions in solitary
76. 406 F. Supp. at 323-24. The unsanitary living conditions were due to insect
infestation; overcrowding; inadequate plumbing, heating, ventilation and electrical
systems; inadequate facilities for personal hygiene; and inadequate refuse and waste
disposal. Id.
77. Id. at 325. See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 376-77. A prisoner said of
San Quentin Prison: "There is more tension here than anywhere else I have ever been.
You never know when you are going to be hit. The only time you can relax is when
you are in your cell and the door is locked." WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 150.
78. 406 F. Supp. at 325. See also Bergesen & Hoerger, Judicial Misconceptions
and the "Hidden Agenda" in Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 747,
769-70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bergesen & Hoerger].
79. 406 F. Supp. at 326. See also Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel
and Unusual Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal
Institutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1972).
80. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
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confinement cells as constituting cruel and unusual punish-
ment. A number of cases have held punitive incarceration in
the segregation cell to be cruel and unusual even though the
conditions under which the general prison population lived
were not.
Illustrative of this trend was Wright v. McMann' in which
a New York federal court found the conditions in the isolation
cells at Clinton State Prison in Dannemora, New York, uncon-
stitutional. Prominent reasons underlying the court's finding
included enforced nudity in cold cells without furniture or per-
sonal hygiene articles which made the cells "dirty, filthy and
unsanitary.""2 In continuing, the court opined that if the condi-
tions as alleged by Wright did in fact exist, they "could only
serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity
of the prisoner. The eighth amendment forbids treatment so
foul, so inhuman and so violative of basic concepts of de-
cency." 3
Several years later, another district court in New York
similarly found the conditions of solitary confinement at Green
Haven Prison cruel and unusual. 4 The court in a strong opinion
argued that "subjecting a prisoner to the demonstrated risk of
the loss of his sanity as punishment for any offense in prison
was plainly cruel and unusual punishment as judged by the
present standards of decency." 5 The court further held that
the conditions of Sostre's confinement were "physically harsh,
destructive of morale, dehumanizing [by being] needlessly
degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance of sanity when
continued for more than a short period of time . ... ,1 This
focus on the psychological effects of long-term isolation was the
important factor that arose out of the reversal of this case in
Sostre v. McGinnis.7 The Second Circuit declared that segre-
81. 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). See also
Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972).
82. 387 F.2d at 521. See also Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn.
1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1972), where cruel and unusual punishment was
found due to incarceration in a five by eight foot concrete cell that lacked adequate
light, heat, ventilation and sanitary facilities.
83. 387 F.2d at 526.
84. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd sub nor.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nor. Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
85. 312 F. Supp. at 871.
86. Id. at 868. See also Bergesen & Hoerger, supra note 78, at 773-74.
87. 442 F.2d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 1971).
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gated confinement in solitary or maximum security was not per
se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment, and that Sostre's segregation, while severe, was
not barbarous or shocking to the conscience."8 However, this
court's inquiry into the psychological effects of solitary confine-
ment gave further support to the mental cruelty aspect of cruel
and unusual punishment as set forth in Trop v. Dulles."9 Such
a direction indicates that the courts may now be receptive to a
diminished capacity defense as proposed here based on nega-
tion of elements due to the mental effects of penal incarcera-
tion.
Spain v. Procunier° is the most recent case in the mold
first set by the courts in Jordan. In Spain, the court was con-
fronted with the claims of six inmates of the Adjustment Cen-
ter at the California State Prison at San Quentin who claimed
the conditions of solitary confinement were unconstitutional.
The cells of the Adjustment Center were described as being six
feet by eight feet, with a concrete floor, a steel sleeping slab
extending from the wall, a sink, and a seatless toilet.9 '
Conditions in the Adjustment Center ranged from extreme
to total sensory deprivation, prisoners being confined in their
cells twenty-four hours a day. 2 During family or attorney vis-
its, inmates were subjected to manacles and chains,93 which the
court found painful, unnecessary, and counterproductive in
that they tended to cause humiliation, rage and resentment. 4
In its opinion the court found that tension between officers
and inmates in the Adjustment Center controlled emotional
responses and manifested itself as hostility, fear and resent-
ment. 5 One commentator has warned that the placement of
88. See, e.g., Bums v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Ford v. Board of
Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969).
89. 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958). See text accompanying notes 98-108 infra for an
examination of the psychological effects of solitary confinement.
90. 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976). This was a federal civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 66 supra.
91. Id. at 542. See also K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 72-73 (1968).
92. Hollander, The "Adjustment Center": California's Prisons Within Prisons,
1 BLACK L.J. 152, 153 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hollander].
An inmate is supposed to be let out for exercise each day, but frequently he is not
allowed out for several days at a time. Inmates are never permitted any yard or outdoor
privileges or exercise whatsoever. 408 F. Supp. at 543.
93. 408 F. Supp. at 544.
94. Id. at 545 n.15.
95. Id. at 543. See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329-30 (1976); Hol-
lander, supra note 92, at 154, See generally S. COHEN & L. TAYLOR, PSYCHOLOGICAL
SURVIVAL: THE EXPERIENCE OF LONG TEaM IMPRISONMENT 60-84 (1972).
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"an inmate in the Adjustment Center cannot be considered a
mere regulation for safe custody of prisoners, but one which can
cause mental illness, suicidal tendencies, and drastically inter-
fere with the possibility of rehabilitation."" The court con-
cluded that the continuous segregation of plaintiffs, the denial
of fresh air and regular outdoor exercise, the unwarranted use
of tear gas to remove plaintiffs from their cells, and the abhor-
rent and shocking use of excessive restraints for all out-of-cell
movements constituted cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Consti-
tution."
These decisions demonstrate the dehabilitative conditions
of prisons. The evidentiary findings of the federal courts in
these cases and the legal conclusion that they violate the eighth
amendment emphasize the character of the external stresses
that prisoners must endure. Against this backround, an exami-
nation of the psychological effects of prison confinement, par-
ticularly solitary confinement, highlights the applicability of
diminished capacity to crimes committed in prison.
The Psychological Effects of Penal Incarceration
Any type of prolonged incarceration is capable of produc-
ing grave psychological effects. These effects are most accur-
ately illustrated by studies of mental deterioration produced by
solitary confinement.
Part of the rationale for declaring the conditions of solitary
confinement to be cruel and unusual is the distinct deteriora-
tion of psychological functioning that is noted in the inmates.
The two major reasons usually given for this are the sensory
deprivation induced by such an environment and the involun-
tary aspects of isolation.
Sensory deprivation can cause a normal adult to begin
experiencing psychotic-like symptoms and push a troubled
person in the direction of serious emotional illness.9 An inmate
placed in solitary confinement loses all contact with sensory
stimuli other than the constant and generally unpleasant sti-
96. Hollander, supra note 92, at 155. A former prison psychiatrist has stated of
the Adjustment Centers: -"I don't think a place more destructive of a man's mental
health could be devised if we tried." Id. at 154.
97. 408 F. Supp. at 545.
98. Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. 322 F. Supp. 473, 481(S.D.N.Y. 1970), injunction modified, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also
COHEN & TAYLOR, supra note 95, at 44-47.
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muli of his surroundings. Psychologists have observed that
such sensory isolation produces declines in mental functioning
and the most extreme forms of psychopathology such as deper-
sonalization, hallucinations and delusions." This has been ex-
plained by the fact that in addition to giving specific informa-
tion, senses have a non-specific function of maintaining the
normal organization of the brain. If the use of the sensory
systems is severely limited for any length of time, this normal
organization begins to falter. In addition, the uniform regu-
lated atmosphere of solitary confinement deprives the inmate
of the stimuli needed to maintain thinking and perceiving
skills. The structural setting of solitary confinement also has
an adverse effect on the inmate's ability to interact with other
people and to creatively respond to the outside environment.,"'
Prolonged exposure to a monotonous environment impairs
thinking, evokes childish emotional responses, disturbs visual
perception, changes brain wave patterns, and causes hallucina-
tions. Without a changing sensory environment, the brain
ceases to function adequately, leading to abnormalities of be-
havior.'0 ' Persons living in solitary confinement report symp-
toms such as extreme boredom, restlessness, irritability, anger,
unrealistic fears and anxieties, and depression.0 2 It is these
behavioral abnormalities which act to negate the requisite
mens rea of crimes committed while incarcerated and which
provide the basis of the diminished capacity defense based on
prison conditions.
The destructive aspects of involuntary isolation signifi-
cantly hinder the rehabilitation process.0 3 The rigid organiza-
tion of the prisoner's life divests him of the opportunity to
99. See, e.g., SOLOMON, SENSORY DEPRIVATION (1961); Heron, The Pathology of
Boredom, 196 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 52 (Jan. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Heron].
100. Benjamin & Lux, Constitutional and Psychological Implications of the Use
of Solitary Confinement: Experience at the Maine State Prison, 2 NEw ENG. J. PRISON
L. 27, 33 (1975), reprinted from 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 83 (June 1975). See also G.
SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 73-83 (1958).
101. See Heron, supra note 99, at 56. Prisoners of war returning from North
Vietnam reported that "the isolation and monotony of prison surpasses in psychologi-
cal horror and human degradation all the beatings and rats and diarrhea." Hollander,
supra note 92, at 154-55.
102. D. SCHULTZ, SENSORY RESTRICTION: EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR 99 (1965); Thoenig,
Solitary Confinement-Punishment Within the Letter of the Law, or Psychological
Torture? 1972 Wis. L. REv. 223, 231-33.
103. Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Ther-
apy Is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605 (1974); Stender, The Need to Abolish
"Corrections," 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 793 (1974).
[Vol. 17874
DIMINISHED CAPA CITY
make meaningful choices and this divestment serves to erode
the prisoner's self-respect which can result in severe emotional
problems. The emotional problems, manifested by suicidal or
homicidal tendencies, represent the inmate's desire to affirm
the fact of his existence to others. A failure to do so would result
in withdrawal, which may lead to a psychotic-like state."4
An experiment conducted under simulated prison condi-
tions is quite illustrative of the debilitative effects of punitive
isolation. The coercive environment was shown to cause deteri-
oration of the subject-prisoners' psychological functioning at
both social and interpersonal levels.' The negative anti-social
reactions observed were not viewed as the product of an envi-
ronment created by combining a collection of deviant personal-
ities, but rather as the result of an intrinsically pathological
situation which distorted and rechanneled behavior in essen-
tially normal individuals.114 The "prisoners" exhibited various
reactions to their confinement. Some suffered severe emotional
disturbances. Others endeavored to be model "prisoners" by
obeying every order. Still others openly rebelled against the
repressive situation by using both direct force and shrewd ma-
neuvering, designed to foement unrest among fellow inmates.
"The breakdown in prison cohesion was the start of social dis-
integration which gave rise not only to feelings of isolation but
deprecation of other prisoners as well."'0 7 The loss of personal
identity, the arbitrary control by the "guards," and the
"prisoners" dependency and emasculation all combined to re-
104. See Blackburn, Prison Discipline and the Eighth Amendment: A Psycholog-
ical Perspective, 43 CIN. L. Rxv. 101, 114-17 (1974); Singer, Confining Solitary Confine-
ment: Constitutional Arguments for a New "Penology, " 56 IOWA L. REv. 1251, 1264-72
(1971).
The loss of freedom means that the prisoner is divested of responsibility for his
life-everything is done for him, all decisions of importance are outside his control. He
is utterly powerless, subject to the arbitrary- will of others. The prisoner is constantly
reminded of his total lack of freedom, and the awareness of his subjugation becomes
the central motif in his life. WIom', supra note 58, at 150.
105. Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,
1 INT'L J. CRIMIN. & PEN. 69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Haney]. See also Zimbardo,
The Psychology of Imprisonment: Privation, Power and Pathology, in D. ROSENHAN &
P. LONDON, THEORY AND RESEARCH IN ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 270-87 (1975).
106. Haney, supra note 105, at 90. The experiment was conducted by arbitrarily
separating the subjects into "guards" and "prisoners." After a short period of time the
"guards" seemed to derive pleasure from insulting, threatening, humiliating and dehu-
manizing their peers. The typical "prisoner" syndrome was one of passivity, depend-
ency, depression, helplessness and self-deprecation. The experiment was terminated
after only six days due to the severity of the subjects' reactions. Id. at 81-89.
107. Id. at 95.
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suit in the pathological prisoner syndrome brought on by their
confinement.'0
These resultant psychological effects of prison incarcera-
tion, while severe enough to warrant a finding of cruel and
unusual punishment, have not yet been applied to the spectre
of criminal responsibility. However, the same type of analysis
can be used to provide a diminished capacity defense for crimes
committed during incarceration while under the influence of
severe emotional stress similar to that found in earlier dimin-
ished capacity cases.
THE DEFENSE
Findings of diminished capacity have historically been
based on evidence of injury, disease, intoxication, or external
pressures affecting a person's reasoning ability.0 9 The existence
of deplorable conditions inside prison can supply the external
pressures or produce the mental defect or disease upon which
mitigation of criminal responsibility can be found, based on a
specific psychiatric disorder.
The Psychiatric Basis
There is a mental disorder recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association known as a transient situational dis-
turbance,"10 which will provide an example of the medical basis
for a finding of diminished capacity caused by prison condi-
tions. This classification encompasses "transient disorders of
any severity that occur in individuals without apparent under-
lying mental disorders and which represent an acute reaction
to overwhelming environmental stress.'
Upon a showing that the conditions inside prison are so
repressive to the individual, a psychiatrist can draw the conclu-
sion that these factors amount to such a degree of environmen-
tal stress as to bring about a transient situational disturb-
ance." 2 This disorder is also more likely to appear in persons
108. See id. at 95-96.
109. See cases cited in notes 1-4 supra.
110. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS No. 307, at 48 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM IMl.
111. Id.
112. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1968), where Goffman comments on the pris-
oner's adaptation to the repressive atmosphere through the mechanism of "situational
withdrawal." The inmate withdraw apparent attention from everything except events
immediately around his body -and sees these in a perspective not employed by others
present. Id. at 61.
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suffering from an epileptoid personality disorder, otherwise
known as an explosive personality."' Such persons are gener-
ally considered excitable, aggressive and over-responsive to
environmental pressures."' As this description fits many of
those incarcerated in prison, "5 it appears that the concurrence
of these two disorders could result in violent behavior over
which the actor would have little or no control. If the patient
suffering from a transient situational disturbance has a strong
adaptive ability his symptoms would usually recede as the
stress diminishes."' This would account for the relatively nor-
mal behavior of the inmate after removal from such a repres-
sive atmosphere.
It is this author's opinion that the acute reactions to over-
whelming environmental stress are similar to the psychiatric
bases upon which diminished capacity cases have been de-
cided. By drawing parallels between those cases and the psy-
chological effects of penal incarceration, a persuasive argument
can be made for the extension of the diminished capacity de-
fense.
Mental defect or disease. The earliest decision involving
the use of the diminished capacity defense was People v.
Wells, "7 in which the defendant was confined in prison at the
time he assaulted a guard. Although their testimony was not
admitted by the trial judge, psychiatrists described Wells as
suffering from a state of tension under which he was highly
sensitive to external stimuli which caused him to react abnor-
mally. It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court
has recently held that such a state of tension permeates the
prison context where the inherent conflicts between guards and
prisoners make interpersonal relationships of any kind a source
of fear and distrust."' With the prevalence of such conditions,
a high sensitivity to external stimuli could easily result in acute
113. DSM II, supra note 110, No. 301.3, at 42. This behavior pattern is character-
ized by gross outbursts of rage or of verbal or physical aggressiveness, which is strik-
ingly different from the patient's usual behavior patterns.
114. Id.
115. WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 151. Widespread violence in prisons is due to the
inmates' propensity towards violence, and their close confinement in sordid conditions
merely adds to their sense of frustration. Note, A Reexamination of Justifiable Escape,
2 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 205, 218 (1976).
116. DSM II, supra note 110, No. 307 at 48.
117. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949). See text
accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
118. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974).
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reactions to the overwhelming environmental stress-in effect,
a transient situational disturbance.
The mental defect recognized in Gorshen" as the basis of
the diminished capacity finding can also be analogized to the
prison situation. With police officers at his side, Gorshen shot
his foreman. Testimony was admitted to show that his act was
a compulsive reaction to an inner unappeasable anger, and
that the resulting behavior was a mental release from threat-
ened insanity. It is proposed that if the conditions of a pris-
oner's incarceration created a state of impending mental disin-
tegration from overwhelming environmental stress, a resulting
criminal act should also be viewed as an uncontrollable reac-
tion for which the actor does not have full responsibility. An
inmate's confinement and lack of control over his own life have
been found to generate rage, personal disorganization, and a
constant sense of panic.'20 The fact that an inmate has no possi-
bility of escape could not stop a train of obsessive thoughts
which would result in an outbreak of violence serving to release
the danger of mental disintegration.' Compulsive behavior to
avoid threatened insanity should be recognized as the cause of
much of the violence in prison, and mitigation of crimes by the
use of the diminished capacity defense should be extended to
encompass such situations.
The test of criminal responsibility in Wolff 2 ' and
Goedecke'23 was the extent of mature and meaningful reflection
upon the gravity of a contemplated act. It can be argued that
criminal acts in prison which are the product of a moment's
opportunity are not subject to this mature and meaningful re-
flection. The nature of the transient situational disturbance is
such that outbursts of rage and aggressiveness occur without
notice or time for formation of the requisite mental state for
legal culpability. In such cases the defense of diminished ca-
pacity based on prison conditions should be applicable.
119. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959). See text accompany-
ing notes 14-21 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 103-104 supra. See also Stender, Violence and
Lawlessness at Soledad Prison, in WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 229.
121. See People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 336 P.2d 492, 496 (1959), where
the defendant's obsessive thoughts of killing his victim were not obviated by the
presence of police officers at his side.
122. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). See
text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
123. People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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Unconsciousness. A similar finding should be made on an
analysis of the determination of unconsciousness in Newton. "4
The defendant suffered a reflex shock reaction from a stomach
wound which caused him to act while not conscious of his ac-
tions. With the rampant jungle atmosphere and wide prolifera-
tion of weapons inside prison," 5 it is not uncommon for prison-
ers to be stabbed or wounded and then act in retaliation
against their aggressors or innocent third parties. In such cases
the actor may be suffering from a similar reflex shock reaction,
which, if it occurred outside of prison, would be a complete
defense to a charge of criminal homicide. This should be no less
of a defense simply because the actor was incarcerated at the
time the act was committed-the conditions of incarceration
make it even more likely for such "unconsciousness" to occur.
Irresistible Impulse. Cantrell' presented the proposition
of mitigation of a criminal homicide charge through irresistible
impulse. Cantrell was diagnosed as being a "situational homo-
sexual" whose act of strangulation was a compulsive reaction
to external stress. He had no control over his actions, which
were aimed at turning off the external stimulus to prevent his
going crazy. His actions were similar to the acute reaction to
overwhelming environmental stress which characterizes the
transient situational disturbance. A prisoner's response to the
repressive conditions of his incarceration could be such that he
would have to act to prevent the loss of his own sanity. Violence
can be a highly individualistic form of rebellion by a prisoner
to defend his dignity."7 The resultant mental disorder, through
which the actor loses control over his actions, should allow
mitigation of the committed act as a compulsive reaction to
externally imposed stress. The transient nature of the disturb-
ance lends more weight to the argument for mitigation, since
relatively normal behavior results after the repressive stimulus
has been removed.
The factors historically used to mitigate criminal acts
through diminished capacity have their parallels in the prison
124. People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970). See text
accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
125. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 376-77 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Spain
v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 544 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
126. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
127. Stender, Violence and Lawlessness at Soledad Prison, in WRIGHT, supra
note 58. at 230.
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context. It is urged that the repressive conditions of incarcera-
tion provide an external stimulus which is equally, if not more
psychologically damaging than those previously relied upon in
diminished capacity decisions. The defense, therefore, should
be extended to encompass this area of criminal responsibility.
The Evidentiary Basis
Despite the existence of evidence of prison conditions, a
problem exists in placing that evidence before the court. Courts
have excluded such evidence as irrelevant, but there is author-
ity for allowing sociological testimony in a criminal proceeding
which can provide the basis for the diminished capacity de-
fense.
In People v. Poddar, 2 the defense attempted to place in
evidence testimony by an expert social scientist to aid in estab-
lishing a defense of diminished capacity. The trial judge admit-
ted testimony by an anthropologist as to facts of cross-cultural
difficulties but did not permit the expert to testify as to the
direct effect of cultural stress on the defendants. The trial
judge also allowed psychiatric experts to answer hypothetical
questions based on research supplied by the sociological ex-
pert.'29 The court of appeal agreed, warning that "to allow
[direct presentation of independent] testimony on sociologi-
cal, ethnic or like influence" without review by experts in psy-
chological sciences would result in distracting the jury and
removing the mental capacity of the accused from their delib-
eration.'10 The net effect of the court's ruling was to allow the
admissibility of the sociologist's testimony as long as it did not
go to the direct consequences of the external factors on the
defendant's mind. This technique permits the sociological ex-
pert to describe those factors in his testimony prior to having
a psychiatrist relate the probable effect of such stress on the
defendant's capacity to harbor malice aforethought, premedi-
tation and intent to kill.
Whether or not a psychologist qualifies as an expert wit-
ness concerning the sanity or insanity of a defendant depends
128. 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1972) rev'd on other grounds, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d
342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974). The decision of the court of appeal approved of the use
of an anthropologist as an expert witness. The supreme court reversed the decision
based on error in the instructions, expressly deeming it unnecessary to resolve the
remaining contentions. 10 Cal. 3d at 761, 518 P.2d at 350, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 918.




on the relevant facts, the questions propounded to the witness,
and his particular qualifications.' 3' Similarly, whether or not a
sociologist qualified as an expert for this defense will depend
on his qualifications to testify as to prison conditions, which are
within the concern of the court.
The prevailing view permits expert testimony on special-
ized matters outside the scope of ordinary experience. The ex-
pert testimony attempts to provide persons of ordinary experi-
ence with working knowledge of a special field, so that these
persons can make informed judgements on matters pertaining
to that field.'32 What the social scientist can do in the court-
room is to present certain social facts that otherwise would
have to be assumed, which serve as conditions affecting the
outcome of the case. In the opinion of one commentator,
"reliability of conclusions of sociological and psychological re-
search is generally higher than diagnoses made by psychia-
trists, which have long been accepted as expert testimony by
the courts."' 33
While the court in Poddar ruled that sociological testi-
mony cannot go directly to the determination of one's mental
state, the sociologist can testify as to the factors affecting it,
leaving to the psychiatrist the determination of whether or not
mental capacity was actually diminished due to the external
influences. It is proper for an expert witness to express his own
opinion based on facts testified to by another expert witness,
put to him in the form of hypothetical questions.'34 Therefore,
for the purposes of this defense, a sociologist or criminologist
could testify about the conditions that exist inside prison, but
not as to their effect on the minds of those incarcerated therein.
131. See People v. Davis, 62 Cal. 2d 791, 801, 402 P.2d 142, 148, 44 Cal. Rptr.
454, 460 (1965). See also CAL. EvID. CODE § 720 (West 1974), which provides in relevant
part: "A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject
to which his testimony relates." For articles commenting on the importance of psychol-
ogists and sociologists as expert witnesses, see generally Clark, The Social Scientist as
an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Litigation, 1 Soc. PROB. 5 (1953); Louisell, The
Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 MINN. L. REv. 235 (1955); Robbins, The
Admissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-Oriented Legal Adjudication, 50
IND. L.J. 493 (1975).
132. People v. Flynn, 166 Cal. App. 2d 501, 509, 333 P.2d 37, 41 (1958). See also
CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1974).
133. Rose, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness, 40 MINN. L. REv. 205, 215
(1956).
134. People v. Lewis, 186 Cal. App. 2d 585, 601, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263, 272 (1960). See
also People v. Flynn, 166 Cal. App. 2d 501, 509, 333 P.2d 37, 41 (1958). CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 804 (West 1974).
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The psychiatrist, basing his opinion on his examination of the
defendant in light of the testimony of the sociologist, can then
evaluate the effects of prison conditions on the defendant.'
31
The practitioner presenting a defense of diminished capac-
ity based on prison conditions should anticipate the eviden-
tiary challenges to the sociologist's expert testimony by laying
a factual foundation to support its relevancy. This can be ac-
complished by calling as witnesses tiermates or cellmates of the
accused, who could testify first-hand as to the particular condi-
tions of their confinement. The sociologist could then relate
their testimonies to his own expertise on prison conditions,
analogizing that the circumstances of the defendant's incarcer-
ation were similar to those which have been examined and
declared to be cruel and unusual. The psychiatrist could then
present his own opinion as to the effect of those conditions on
the capacity of the defendant to harbor intent, malice or pre-
meditation, basing his conclusions on the preceding testimo-
nies together with his personal examination of the defendant.
In this manner all the factors that should be considered by
the court for a finding of diminished capacity based on prison
conditions could properly be placed into evidence. A determi-
nation of either the presence or the lack of capacity to harbor
malice, intent and premeditation can then be made in light of
all of the relevant evidence necessary for a finding of mitiga-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Diminished capacity can mitigate criminal responsibility.
Psychiatric testimony introduced in previous diminished ca-
pacity decisions analogized to the prison context shows how
conditions of incarceration could produce the same type of psy-
chological disturbances that gave rise to a finding of mitiga-
tion, and the method of using experts to present this evidence
for the court's consideration is clear.
This proposed defense does not suggest that there be no
135. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally 111, 14 STAN. L. REV.
59, 83 (1961), where it is stated that the practice of modem psychiatry demands a total
approach to the patient which includes everything that has happened to him, starting
with his ancestors and going through the entire life history up to the present moment.
This same totalistic approach, Diamond suggests, should be carried over into the
courtroom. Thus, this approach would include relevant data from psychologists or
sociologists relating to the social variables that contribute to the particular state of
mind of the defendant.
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culpability for crimes committed by inmates in prisons. None-
theless, the diminished capacity defense should be applicable
to certain acts which were the product of either a moment's
opportunity or the stress of degrading prison conditions, miti-
gating the crime to a lesser offense. The existence of a dimin-
ished capacity defense based on prison conditions is ultimately
a sad commentary on the conditions themselves, and it is
hoped that the problems inherent in our modern correctional
system will be faced and solved in the future.
Michael Lee Marx

